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• Project scope
• Team membership
• What are they
• Why we’re concerned
• Background, history, issues
• Service, materials, construction, inspection
• Risk based approach
• How many vessels, and project funding
• LPV project elements
• Final product
• Opportunities for collaboration
Outline
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• …To assess and reduce risks associated with LPV, with the goal of developing a standard 
Agency process for continued usage, maintenance, and inspection of LPV.
• This team will also configure an online repository to document, to the extent practical, LPV 
design, fabrication, materials, operation, inspection , maintenance, and repair data.  This 
repository will facilitate implementation of a consistent program of minimum maintenance and 
vessel inspection requirements.
• (Charter letter from Terrence W. Wilcutt, Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA)
Project Scope
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• A pressure vessel using layered construction of relatively thin material to provide pressure retaining capability 
equivalent to a thicker monolithic vessel.
• Various constructions are permitted, including concentric layers, coil wound, shrink fit, and spiral wrapped.
• The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code has allowed for layered heads as well as shells since 1978.
• NASA vessels:
• Concentric wrapped layered shells and monolithic heads.
• Most from late 1950’s and early 1960’s (prior to inclusion in ASME Code)
• Material non-code and not well characterized
• Not inspected in full compliance with code
• Originally rated by yhe manufacturers based on lower safety factor (not compliant with Code), generally 2.5:1 on UTS 
vs. 4:1 then, or 3.5:1 today.
• Mostly 3/8 - 1/2 inch liner and ¼ inch layers
• 299 out of 302 not code-stamped
Layered Pressure Vessels – What Are They?
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Generic LPV Geometry
Shell-to-Shell Longitudinal weld:
Joins edges of wrapper plates (staggered)
Nozzle in head: 
traditional forging
Shell-to-Shell circumferential weld:
Not always present
Hemispherical Head: 
Single-piece construction
Shell penetration nozzle:
Sometimes present in 
horizontal vessels as a 
drain
Manway Access:
Personnel access on 
small number of vessels
Cylindrical Shell Section:
Inner layer of typically ½” steel wrapped in 
numerous layers of typically ¼” steel
Head-to-Shell 
circumferential weld
Expanded view of 
cross section on next 
slide
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Generic LPV Geometry
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• Rolled and welded shells
• Formed or forged heads
• Forged nozzles in head and sometimes in shell
• Shell longitudinal welds offset, circumferential welds through-thickness
• Layer gaps and efficiency
• Good construction for the time, but many welding defects
Construction
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• NASA has approximately 300 layered pressure vessels (LPV)
• Currently about 200 in service but desirable to return the others to service as well
• Replacement cost $0.5B to $1.0
• Some purchased directly, some acquired from DoD
• High stored energy
• Challenges ensuring safety and reliability, how to mitigate risks
• Not equivalent to ASME Section VIII Division 2 compliant vessels
Background
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• OSHA General Industry regulations require ASME Code construction for many pressure vessel 
applications
• OSHA regulations fail to address some NASA LPV applications
• Most NASA LPV are not ASME Code stamped
• OSHA Basic Program Elements for Federal Employees 29 CFR 1960 requires an Alternate 
Standard for cases in which an Agency does not comply with regulations.
• 29 CFR 1960 requires a Supplementary Standard for those cases in which an Agency has 
operations not specifically addressed by the OSHA regulations.
• NASA has operations in both of these categories and intends to develop an 
Alternate/Supplementary Standard for use of LPV
Regulatory Issues
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• Manufacturing method developed in 1930’s
• Incorporated in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code in 1978
• Fabrication advantages
• Some purchased directly, some acquired from DoD
• High stored energy
• Some failures in industry (about 10 out of total  23,000 constructed)
• OSHA discussions
• LaRC, DWC and SwRI work
History
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• Advantages
• Easier to form thin material
• Less full thickness welding and less total weld
• More favorable toughness properties in thin material
• Possible favorable pre-stress
• Leak detection via vent holes
• Disadvantages
• Non-code material with very limited fracture properties characterization (toughness, crack growth rate, 
and transition temperature)
• Layer gaps, possible inconsistent tension, and welding residual stresses make analysis a non-trivial 
task (particularly for older vessels)
• Difficult to inspect inner layers and shell to shell welds
• Very high MDMT for solid heads and full thicknesses welds, typically 120F per current Code
Issues
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LPV at NASA
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Manufacturers of NASA LPV
• AO Smith
• CBI
• Nooter Corp
• Hahn and Clay
• Struthers Wells
• Consolidated Western Steel
• Others
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Service Conditions
• Industry:
• Urea reactors
• Low cycles
• Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) potential
• Often elevated (300-400F) temperature operation, some low temperature
• NASA:
• Most in air or inert gas service (a few in hydrogen service)
• Cyclic operation (pressure swings
• No SCC
• Ambient temperature operation which is below Code MDMT limits at every NASA Center
• Some blowdown service resulting in lower temperature at nozzle and surrounding area
• Often sited in uncontrolled areas with significant staff exposure
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Materials
• Frequently proprietary specifications and non-code
• Not well characterized from a fracture perspective
• Frequently fairly high ductile-brittle transition
• 19 material and condition combinations in NASA vessels, reduced for testing purposes:
• Availability of data
• Similarities of materials
• AOS 1146, AOS 1135G Gr. B, CBI 1143, AOS 1148B, A225B, A212B, A225C, A302B, SA516-
70, SA517F (T-1), A350-LF3, SWC 100302, SA302B SS clad, SA724B
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Analysis
• Models and case studies to understand details and criticality
• Incorporation of layered construction
• Layer gaps
• Welding residual stresses
• Development of analysis tools
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Inspection
• Original fabrication  inspection did not meet 1978 ASME Code 
• Head, outer layer, and head to shell weld inspections manageable
• Inspection of intermediate layers difficult
• Weld locations?
• UT not effective beyond first layer for plate in intermediate weld inspections
• RT sensitivity limited by thickness
• Nozzle to head inspections manageable
• Nozzle to shell inspections challenging
• Shell to shell welds currently difficult to inspect
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Risk Based Approach
• Understand materials
• Understand physics
• Identify potential defects
• Identify risk associated with each
• Determine critical crack sizes for each flaw based on bounding properties and stresses
• Find/Develop capability to inspect for defects of concern
• Address issues of operational temperature on case by case basis
• All flaws addressed logically in some way – probabilistic, analytic, inspection (e.g., deterministic 
analytical approach, can reliably find, always LBB, no crack growth)
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Potential Hoop Loaded Flaws/Inspection 
Techniques
(Current thinking)
Inner 
Shell/Layer
Head
Head to 
Shell Circ
Weld
Shell 
Layers
Shell to 
Shell Circ
Weld
Primary Inspection Method:
Red = Limited or None
Magenta = Leakage
Orange = Guided Wave
Blue = Surface inspection: TECA, Mag
Green = Ultrasonic: PAUT, TFM/FMC
Inner 
Shell/Layer
Head
Head to 
Shell Circ
Weld
Shell 
Layers
Shell to 
Shell Circ
Weld
Inspection Risk:
Red = Not easily found
Orange = Not easily found, but limited consequence
Green = Easily found with existing/known methods
(Hoop loaded flaws only –
similar charts for other 
orientations and 
configurations)
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OSHA Alternate/Supplemental Standard
Will:
• Be part of NASA-STD-8719.17 NASA Requirements for Ground-Based Pressure Vessels and 
Pressurized Systems (PVS)
• Address material properties, construction variability, welding residual stress, fabrication defects, 
analysis, and inspection.
• Define analysis approach
• Defect categories will be identified, then in order to validate operation of a vessel all categories 
must be addressed and their safety validated.
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Flaw Catalog and Inspection Techniques 
(Tentative)
Name
Risk Cube Classification: 1 (good) — 3 
(bad) Mitigation Method(s): Primary, Secondary, Tertiary, N/A
Region Orientatio
n
Flaw Type Location SeverityProbability Detection Rank % PAUT TFM/FM
C
EMATS TECA EC RT Mag AE Leak GW Analyt. Comments
SS H Si W 3 1 3 29.6 T S N/A N/A N/A T N/A T S P S
SS A Si W 2 2 3 11.6 T P N/A N/A N/A T N/A T S S S
NH M Si F 1 3 2 2.3 P P S N/A N/A N/A N/A T N/A N/A
NS H Si H 2 2 2 7.4 P P P N/A N/A N/A N/A T N/A N/A
NH M So F 1 2 2 1.9 P P S N/A N/A N/A N/A T N/A N/A
HS H Si A 2 1 2 4.2 P S N/A N/A N/A T N/A T S S
HS A Si W 2 2 1 4.2 P S N/A N/A N/A T N/A T N/A T
HS A So A 2 2 1 4.2 P S N/A P N/A T T T N/A N/A
SS A So A 2 2 1 4.2 T P N/A P N/A T S T N/A N/A
NS H C P 3 1 1 3.7 T T S S P N/A N/A T S N/A
SS H So W 3 1 1 3.7 T S N/A P N/A T S T N/A S
HS H So A 3 1 1 3.7 P S N/A P N/A T S T N/A S
WP H T P 1 3 3 2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A S N/A P N/A N/A
NS H E F 1 3 3 2.8 P P S N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
SS A E F 1 3 3 2.8 S P N/A N/A N/A T N/A N/A N/A N/A P
LW H T W 1 3 3 2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A S N/A P N/A N/A P Middle
NH M E F 1 3 2 2.3 P P S N/A N/A N/A N/A T N/A N/A
IP H Si H 1 1 3 1.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A T N/A S N/A N/A P Bounded by IP-H-T-A
NS H Si F 1 3 1 1.9 P P S N/A N/A N/A N/A T P N/A
NP A So H 1 2 3 2.3 P P N/A N/A N/A N/A T T N/A N/A
LW H T W 1 3 1 1.9 N/A N/A N/A P* N/A S P* P N/A N/A Outer
NH C C P 2 1 1 1.9 P T T T S N/A N/A T N/A T
HS A E F 1 3 1 1.9 P S N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
NP H So F 1 2 2 1.9 P P N/A S N/A N/A T T N/A N/A
SS A Si F 1 2 1 1.4 T S N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A T P N/A
HS A Si F 1 2 1 1.4 P S N/A N/A N/A T N/A T P T
IP H T A 1 1 1 0.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A T N/A S P N/A P
Validating an Aging, Non-compliant Product 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 23
Quantities / Locations
• NASA
• Total of approximately 300 vessels at eight Centers (currently 200 in service)
• DoD
• AEDC
• Vandenberg
• White Oak
• Others?
• DOE?
• Private Sector
• Typically in urea reactors in fertilizer plants
• Petro-chemical?
• Other commercial applications
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Project Elements (status/schedule next 
slide)
• Materials studies
• Stress analysis
• NDE
• Probabilistic aspects
• Documentation
• OSHA Alternate and Supplemental Standard
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LPV Program Anticipated Technical Path
Material 
Testing
Probabilistic & 
Fracture
Structural 
Analysis
NDE
Case Studies
Parametric Models Deterministic Models: 
Distributable
Properties
PIRT 
Tables
Parameter DistributionProbabilistic 
Models
Failure Probability Models: 
Distributable
Defect Population
Technique Development
POD Demonstration
FFS 
Method
Probabilistic & 
Fracture
Structural 
Analysis
NDE
Pi Tape, AE, 
Chemistry, 
Hardness, 
Inspection, PAUT, 
Hydro Tests, etc.
Assessment of Relative 
Risk
LPV Program Development and 
Reporting
FY16-FY19
OSHA Alternate 
Standard
FY20+
If no 
findin
gs
If 
findings
Technique Identification
Validating an Aging, Non-compliant Product 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 26
LPV Program Documentation
OSHA Alt-Standard
FY19-FY20
NASA Alt-Standard For Continued 
Use of Non-Code LPV’s
Contains succinct FFS 
methodology for non-
code LPV’s. References 
the wrap-up report for 
background and logic.
LPV Program 
Wrap-Up TM
Contains detailed 
guidance on FFS 
methodology and logic. 
Ties the disciplines 
together into complete 
story. Lessons Learned.
FFS Method
FY18-FY19
Detailed Discipline 
Reports
FY18-FY19
“Data Dump”
Task 
Reports
FY13-FY19
Flash 
reports, 
work order 
reports, 
contractor 
reports, 
literature 
references, 
etc.
Structural Analysis 
TM
Material Testing TM
Probabilistic CR
NDE TM
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NASA Funding, Commitment
• 1975 First material testing
• $1 Million OSMA funding prior to focused Agency effort
• Cyclic testing
• NESC effort 2014
• Current $5.2M budget began 2016
• 2016 $1M
• 2017 $1.2M
• 2018 $1.0M
• 2019 $1.0M (est.)
• 2020 $1.0M (est.)
• Significant staffing and testing resources at Marshall Space Flight Center
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Other Agency Participation
• AEDC – Project F2F meetings
• Vandenberg – Project F2F meetings
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Opportunities for Collaboration
• NASA currently “tapped out” on engineering and test resources
• Course to completion fairly well defined
• Opportunities to contribute through testing
• Improve data fidelity (larger sample size)
• Test materials outside those in NASA LPV
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Questions?
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